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public trust doctrine, the state holds shore lands in trust for the use by
the public and protects the public's right to fishing, fowling, and
navigation on the flats. As the state had not granted authority to
Barnstable to act on behalf of public trust rights, the court held the
portions of the Barnstable's bylaws that granted the Commission
powers to further the public's interest in trust lands were invalid.
Consequently, the court severed the section of the bylaws concerning
the protection of public trust rights.
The court disagreed with the Fafards' argument that state statutes
regarding pier regulations preempted the Barnstable pier regulations.
The court concluded the state statutes were not comprehensive and
only established minimum statewide standards regarding pier
regulations. Local municipalities were free to establish more stringent
standards in addition to the state laws, and to require a local permit, as
well as the state permit. The court held the Barnstable bylaws did not
frustrate the purpose of state regulations regarding licensing for the
construction of piers but furthered the interests that the legislature
intended to protect in enacting the state statutes. The legislature
granted local conservation commissions the authority to take
regulatory action to protect the recreational value of wetlands and to
act as a local advisory to the state Department of Environmental
Protection.
Because state statutes did not preempt the Barnstable pier
regulations, the court held the Commission had the authority to deny
the Fafards permission to construct the pier. The court sustained the
Commission's decision on the basis of powers granted by the
legislature to local conservation commissions to protect recreational
values, not on the bylaws which purported to give the Commission the
authority to act to further public trust rights.
Spencer L. Sears
MISSOURI
Rosenfeld v. Thoele, 28 S.W.3d 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
placement of debris, fill area, and tie wall on neighboring land
produced a cause of action for both trespass and nuisance).
Donald Rosenfeld ("Rosenfeld"), sued his neighbor, Virginia A.
Thoele ("Thoele"), alleging nuisance and trespass arising out of
Thoele's placement of debris, a fill area, and a tie wall on Rosenfeld's
land. Rosenfeld sought both an injunction and damages. Thoele
moved to dismiss. The trial court granted Thoele's motion to dismiss
without prejudice. The Missouri Court of Appeals determined it had
jurisdiction, reiterating that, generally, dismissal without prejudice was
not a final judgment and therefore not appealable.
Rosenfeld alleged Thoele entered upon Rosenfeld's land without
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authorization. Thoele argued the statute of limitations barred the
The court rejected Thoele's argument because
trespass action.
records at St. Charles County Circuit Court showed Rosenfeld filed the
petition within one year.
Rosenfeld argued Thoele placed and maintained the debris, fill
area, and tie wall in an "extremely shoddy and ugly form" that
adversely affected the commercial value of Rosenfeld's land. The
court noted that, because no exact rule to determine nuisance existed,
jury resolutions best suited nuisance actions. The court held a
reasonable juror could conclude the defendant's placement and
maintenance of debris, a fill area, and a tie wall was unreasonable. A
reasonable juror could also conclude Thoele's actions substantially
impaired Rosenfeld's ability to peacefully enjoy his land. The court
noted the existence of unsightly debris, a fill area, and a tie wall did
not create an actionable nuisance. Instead, the court focused on the
fact that the unsightliness of the debris adversely affected Rosenfeld's
land.
Rosenfeld then argued Thoele placed and maintained the debris,
fill area, and tie wall in a manner that adversely affected the water
table upon Rosenfeld's land. Also, Rosenfeld argued Thoele caused a
displacement of both the water reservoir and the flood plain upon
Rosenfeld's land, and the diversion of surface waters onto Rosenfeld's
land obstructed a natural surface water drain. The court determined
Rosenfeld did not specifically allege Thoele's debris caused surface
water runoff to circumvent or exceed the capacity of its natural
drainway.
Thoele argued Rosenfeld's claim for injunctive relief was moot
because Thoele removed the tie wall. The court agreed with Thoele
and held the case was moot. However, Rosenfeld also sought
injunctive relief for the debris and fill area, as well as reestablishment
of the grade. The court held the removal of the tie wall did not
preclude the circuit court from granting injunctive relief.
Rosenfeld further alleged Thoele was the owner of the tract of
land adjacent to his. Contrarily, Thoele argued Rosenfeld failed to
join the owner of the land in question as a defendant. The court
concluded a trustee, not Thoele, owned the adjacent land in question.
The court noted the elements of trespass do not include ownership of
adjacent property. Further, although the strict definition of nuisance
mentions the defendant's unreasonable use of his or her property, the
primary focus is on the defendant's unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment of land. The court stated that one who creates
a nuisance, whether on his property or not, is liable for the damage
caused thereby. The test for liability for damage caused by a nuisance
turns on whether the defendant was in control over the
instrumentality alleged to constitute the nuisance, either through
ownership or otherwise. If this action proceeded in the absence of the
trustee or beneficiaries, their ability to protect their interest therein
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would be impaired. Thus, the court instructed the trial court upon
remand to permit Rosenfeld to join the trustee and beneficiaries as
defendants. Ifjoinder was not feasible, the trial court must determine
whether indispensable parties exist.
Nicole Anderson
NEVADA
So. Fork Band Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nev. v. 6th
Judicial Dist. Ct., 7 P.3d 455 (Nev. 2000) (holding an Indian tribe
waived sovereign immunity when it took possession of reservation land
subject to previously adjudicated water rights).
In 1913, the Nevada State Engineer ("State Engineer") initiated
water rights adjudication procedures for the Humboldt River,
eventually known as the Humboldt Decree ("Decree"). This required
the state engineer and water commissioners to administer the water
rights adjudicated under the Decree. The United States purchased
land, subject to the Decree, to create the South Fork Reservation for
the Te-Moak Tribe of the Western Shoshone Indians ("Tribe"). The
Tribe cooperated with the State Engineer and the water
commissioners, allowing them to cross the reservation to administer
and maintain the Decree. Further, the Tribe paid assessment fees for
administration of the Decree for at least ten years. In spite of this
historical activity, on March 8, 1998, the Tribe adopted resolutions
prohibiting the State Engineer and water commissioners from
entering reservation land and determining the Tribe would no longer
pay assessment fees as required by the Decree.
After the Tribe passed these resolutions, three water
commissioners entered the reservation to access private land that was
inaccessible through any other means, in order to regulate the river in
accordance with the Decree. A tribal peace officer arrested the water
commissioners for trespassing on the reservation.
Subsequently, the State Engineer and water commissioners filed a
complaint with the Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
claiming the Tribe was in contempt for interference with authorities
regulating and administering the Decree. When their motion to
dismiss the complaint was denied, the Tribe filed a writ of prohibition
contending the court lacked jurisdiction over the Tribe, and that the
United States was an indispensable party to the contempt hearing.
In determining whether the district court had jurisdiction over the
Tribe, the Supreme Court of Nevada recognized Indian tribes, like
sovereign powers, enjoy common law immunity from suit. Sovereign
immunity can be waived, but any waiver must be clearly expressed.
However, a waiver does not require explicit declaration indicating that
immunity is waived. The supreme court concluded the purchase of

